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FREE LABOR IN THE NAME OF WORKFARE: NEW YORK'S
REACTION TO THE BRUKHMAN V. GIULIANI DECISION
I NTRODUCTION
Are welfare recipients a 'threat to American civilization"?' Are
welfare recipients causing working people, low and middle income
Americans, to see a decline in their real wages?2 If one followed
the political debate over the decimation of various welfare pro-
grams, Aid to Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC"), and
Food Stamps to single families, one would think that public
assistance recipients are the reason for these ills.
In 1996, however, the cost of federal social programs com-
bined was only $50 billion annually, compared with $170 billion
on federal tax-funded programs for American corporations.3 For
another startling comparison, federal and state spending for AFDC
was approximately $22 billion per year, while the government
spent $150 billion bailing out banks following the Savings and Loan
(US&L") scandal.' Thus, the money spent on the S&L scandal could
have funded the distribution of AFDC in all 50 states for almost
seven years.'
Despite these inconsistencies, Congress and others have contin-
ued to portray welfare reform as one of the most pressing problems
in the United States today.6  Opponents maintain that the impo-
' Jason DeParle, Success, and Frustration, as Welfare Rules Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1997, at A17 (citing House Speaker Newt Gingrich commenting about welfare
recipients on C-Span).
2 For example, the average inflation-adjusted earnings of production and non-supervi-
sory private sector workers dropped 16% between 1973 and 1993. See HOLLY SKLAR,
CHAOS OR COMMUNIY?: SEEKING SOLUTIONS, NOT SCAPEGOATS FOR BAD ECONOMICS 17-18
(1995).
3 See MICHAEL MOORE, DOWNSiZE THISl 43-44 (1996).
4 See Nicola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act of 1996: Political Compromise or
Panacea for Welfare Dependency?, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 333, 334 (1997)
(citing Charles Sennott, Liberals Finding the Aid System is Broken, BOSTON GLOBE, May
17, 1994, at 1).
See Sennott, supra note 4, at 1.
Perhaps they have been able to do so because the image of welfare recipients as
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sition of welfare reform, along with the institution of widespread
mandatory workfare, will improve the lot of public assistance
recipients.7
Nothing could be further from the truth. Workfare, as it is
currently configured, not only fails to provide public assistance re-
cipients with the means to obtain permanent, living wage jobs but
also detrimentally impacts the current workforce. In fact, in today's
new workfare model, the dual goals of moving welfare recipients
into the workplace and maintaining living wage jobs for existing
workers are contradictory.
The program harms the current workforce, or at least the pres-
ervation of living wage jobs. Specifically, welfare recipients are
required to work off the value of their benefit, meaning the hours
they work are credited toward the value of their benefit and food
stamps.8 Since recipients are paid (credited) less than regular em-
ployees,9 local governments may be tempted to reduce the
workforce through attrition and fill those positions with no wage
welfare recipients."° Short of eliminating positions, the availability
of cheaper Work Experience Program ("WEP") workers" depresses
the wages of permanent jobs. 2 What financially strapped, under
staffed local government could resist such a bargain?
On the other side of the coin, the workfare system does a
disservice to its participants in their search for meaningful employ-
able-bodied people taking a government check "fuels the debate in [a way] that is dis-
proportionate to the actual money spent on funding welfare programs." Sennott, supra
note 4, at 1.
" See Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
' See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc.2d 26, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1997), rev'd 678 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1998). The final outcome of this case has yet
to be decided. See infra note 49 and Part IV.
I In New York, for example, WEP participants are paid Federal minimum wage, see
Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 33, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918, while the lowest paid clerical
workers earn $8.69 per hour and blue collar workers earn a minimum of $9.10 per
hour. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, Dec. 23, 1996, at 2-3.
1o Since welfare workers are 'working off" the value of their benefits (the benefits
the city was paying them before they were required to participate in workfare), the mu-
nicipality is actually paying nothing additional for their time worked. Local government
is actually saving many of the costs involved with a regular workforce, such as health
insurance and pension benefits.
" See infra Part I1.
12 See CHRIS TILLY, WORKFARE'S IMPAcT ON THE NEW YORK CITY LABOR MARKET: LOWER




ment. Local governments, in their attempt to justify paying workfare
participants minimum wage while they work side by side with
municipal employees who are paid far higher wages, define the
workfare job descriptions differently enough to make such pay
differentiation justifiable. 3 These job descriptions profess to limit
the activities of workfare participants, thereby allowing the local
government to maintain that workfare participants are truly in a job
category by themselves. 4 This practice enables the local govern-
ment to pay (or credit) workfare participants at a much lower salary
rate than that of regular city employees, while avoiding violating the
anti-displacement provisions, which are supposed to protect paid
employees from being replaced by workfare participants.' Howev-
er, by narrowly defining workfare participants' job descriptions and
professing to confine the range of their responsibilities, advance-
ment possibilities for workfare participants become limited. This
makes it less likely that they will find permanent jobs within the
system.
This Comment will examine the following aspects of welfare
reform: the massive influx of welfare recipients forced to enter
workfare programs, the effect of workfare on the permanent em-
ployment possibilities of its participants, and the side effect on
existing workers.
This Comment begins in Part I with background on the Person-
al Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA"). Part II analyzes the recent New York State Supreme
court decision, Brukhman v. Giuliani,16 in which workfare partici-
pants challenged the New York City workfare program because it
credited their work at minimum wage rather than prevailing wage.
The New York State Supreme Court decided in favor of workfare
participants. Although the Appellate Division, First Department, has
subsequently reversed, the Fourth Department has held the oppo-
site, requiring the Department of Social Services to credit WEP
workers performing skilled work at prevailing wages.' 7 Ultimately,
the issue will have to be resolved by the New York State Court of
Appeals. Part III will address the New York State legislature's imme-
diate attempt to limit the effects of the supreme court's holding in
,3 See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 37, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
U See id.
I See 42 U.S.C. § 607(0(2) (Supp. 11 1996); 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap. 436, § 148.
's See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 26, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
i See Enzian v. Wing, 670 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th Dep't 1998).
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Brukhman by altering the language of the New York State social
services law, upon which the court decision was based. Part IV
argues that New York workfare participants are indeed entitled to
prevailing wages despite the change in the state law. In other
words, the Fourth Department's view is correct. As such, a reversal
of the First Department by the New York Court of Appeals is the
only equitable solution. Finally, in Part V, this Comment will dis-
cuss other ramifications of the PRWORA and its implementation in
New York.
I. PASSAGE OF WELFARE REFORM
Passage of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity and Reconciliation Act of 199618 brought sweeping changes
in the eligibility requirements for individuals and families seeking
public assistance. The PRWORA converts Aid to Families With
Dependent Children ("AFDC") and other programs into a block
grant entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF").
19
The amount of the block grant is based on previous years' welfare
spending.2" The block grant allocation, once established, is frozen
over the next six years.21 While the 1997 federal public assistance
allocation to the states increased funding because of a lack of full
implementation of the PRWORA 2 by 2002, funding levels will
decrease by $1 billion when compared with funding for public
assistance before the PRWORA.23
The block grant method of allocating funds is fundamentally
different than that used by past welfare programs. Formerly, states
provided 20 to 50 percent of the public assistance funding (which
varied depending on the wealth of the state) and received partial
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (Supp. II 1996).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. 11 1996).
20 See id. For an analysis of these statutes, see Mark Greenberg and Steve Savner,
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, Center for Law and Social
Policy (Aug. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Temporary Assistance] < httpd/epn.org/
clasp/clsummary.html>. The amount of the block grant is based on the greater of 1992-
1994, 1994 or 1995's spending for combined AFDC, Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training Program (JOBS), and Emergency Assistance Grants. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(D)
(Supp. 11 1996).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1996).
2 See David A. Super et al., The New Welfare Law, Part II (Center on Budget and




matching grants of the balance from the federal government, there-
by giving states an incentive to increase funding.24 Under the
PRWORA, to receive a full block grant, a state need only maintain
non-federal welfare funding at 80 percent of its fiscal year 1994
level, reduced to 75 percent if a state meets the required work
participation rates.2" Therefore, the incentive for individual states
to provide additional funding has been removed-states will now
aim to provide only the minimum state funding necessary to remain
eligible for a block grant.
The PRWORA also ends guaranteed entitlement to public assis-
tance. Therefore, even if a participant meets all the federal require-
ments (i.e. participating in workfare and not having received a grant
for five years or more), a state can deny aid to any poor family or
category of families.26 In fact the legislation clearly states that it
"shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assis-
tance under any State program funded under this part."2 7 Further,
the law prevents use of the federal block grants to provide assis-
tance to any adult for more than five years; this limit applies even if
the years are not consecutive.28
Another major change in welfare under the PRWORA is the
imposition of work requirements for public assistance recipients, the
primary focus of this note. The PRWORA mandates that states re-
quire that no later than two years following a recipient's receipt of
benefits, that person must be "engaged in work"29 to continue to
receive benefits." Although "work" includes activities that would
help an individual to obtain a permanent, living wage job, such as
training, job searching, and education, participation in these pro-
grams is either limited to a short period or permitted only in addi-
24 See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. II 1996); Greenberg & Savner, Temporary
Assistance, supra note 20.
26 See Super et al., supra note 22, at Part I.
27 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (Supp. 11 1996).
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996); Mark Greenberg & Steve Savner, A
Brief Summary of Key Provisions of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block
Grant of H.R. 3734 (The Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996), Part IV.A.2.
(Aug. 13, 1996) <http-//epn.org/clasp/clsummary.html>.
"Engaged in work' can entail employment, work experience, on-the-job training,
job search and job readiness assistance, community service programs, vocational educa-
tional training, job skills training, education directly related to employment, secondary
education, and provision of child care services. 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (Supp. 11 1996).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11 1996).
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tion to a minimum number of hours of traditional work. 1 A state
must meet the following minimum goals for recipients' participation
in work activities: 75 percent in 1997 and 1998 for two-parent
families, increasing to 90 percent for 1999-2002, requiring 35 hours
per week; for other families, 25 percent in 1997 and increasing 5
percent per year until 2002 at 20 hours per week in 1997-1998, 25
hours in 1999 and 30 hours thereafter. 2 Penalties on the states for
failure to meet these goals include a 5 percent reduction in the
block grant for the following year and 2 percent reductions each
additional year, up to a maximum reduction of 21 percent.3
Further, the PRWORA does not require that public assistance
recipients who participate in the mandatory workfare programs be
paid (or credited) at any specific wage level, not even minimum
wage. 4 In fact, under the federal workfare predecessor, the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program ("JOBS"), 35 at least
one state requested a waiver from meeting minimum wage stan-
dards, asserting instead the right to pay or credit subminimum wag-
es to welfare recipients in work placements. The request, after
protests from local unions, was denied. 6
In addition, the PRWORA includes an anti-displacement provi-
sion to prevent workfare recipients from eliminating existing full-
time workers' jobs. Such provision specifically states:
No adult in a work activity,. . . which is funded in whole or in part, by
funds provided by the Federal Government shall be employed or as-
signed-(A) when any other individual is on layoff from the same or any
substantially equivalent job; or (B) if the employer has terminated the
employment of any regular employee or otherwise caused an involuntary
reduction of its workforce in order to fill the vacancy so created with an
adult whose work activity is [funded in whole or in part with funds pro-
vided by the Federal Government]. 7
3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 607(c)(2)(A)(i) & (d)(8) (Supp. 11 1996).
32 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 607(a) & (c) (Supp. II 1996); Mark Greenberg & Steve Savner,
A Brief Summary of Key Provisions of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Block Grant of H.R. 3734 (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996) Part VI.D. (Aug. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Brief Summary of
PRWORA] <http://epn.org/claspclsummary.html >.
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (Supp. II 1996); Greenberg & Savner, Brief Summary of
PRWORA, supra note 32, at Part V.A.3.
"' See NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAw PROJECT, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF WORKFARE PARTICI-
PANTS AND DISPLACED WORKERS 7 (1996) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 681 et seq.
16 See EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 7.
37 42 U.S.C. § 607(0(2) (Supp. 11 1996).
[Vol. 64:2
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In sum, the PRWORA brings monumental changes to the wel-
fare system. It completely alters the rights of the poor to receive
public assistance and changes how welfare grants are distributed. In
addition, workfare has a major effect on the workplace-for both
the participants and the regularly paid employees with whom
participants work side by side in their assigned workplaces. Al-
though workfare has existed for many years, the sheer number of
workfare participants that will be assigned in the next several years
makes workfare under the PRWORA virtually a new system.
II. THE CHALLENGE IN NEW YORK
Workfare is nothing new in New York; it has existed in some
form for the last twenty-five years." Before passage of the
PRWORA, New York's workfare program required some public
assistance recipients to work for their benefits through the Work
Experience Program. 9 This program originally served Home Relief
recipients (mainly single individuals) and was later expanded to
include Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients (mainly
families with children).4"
A. Statutory Protection
New York State's Constitution, augmented by the pre-1997
social services laws, required that the workfare program pay prevail-
ing wages, thereby protecting both the WEP workers and the regular
and potential city employees.4
This general protection came from article I, section 17, of the
New York State Constitution which provides:
No laborer, workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or sub-
contractor engaged in the performance of any public work, ... shall ...
be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade or occu-
See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc.2d 26, 30, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd 678 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1998).
19 See id.
I Under the Welfare Reform Act of 1997, these categories are now roughly equiva-
lent to the Safety Net Assistance and Family Assistance, respectively. See 1997 N.Y.
Laws Chap. 436, § 141. Family Assistance is the main category addressed in the
PRWORA under the name Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.
41 See N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 17; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 164 (McKinney 1996) (re-
pealed 1997); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §336-c(2)(b) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
19981
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pation in the locality within the state where such public work is to be
situated, erected or used.
4
1
Along with the general protection provided by the New York
State Constitution, the social services law governed the mechanism
for WEP participants under both Home Relief and AFDC. Home
Relief was specifically controlled by section 164, the New York
social services law, which provides that:
The social services official ... shall provide for the establishment of pub-
lic works projects for the assignment of employable persons in receipt of
home relief .... The number of days of work to be given each person
shall be determined by the amount of the budget deficit of the recipient
and his family .... No person shall be required to work for more than
the number of days necessary to earn such amount ....
The reference to "public works" in the social services law
pertaining to WEP workers under Home Relief required the state to
credit WEP workers toward their public assistance benefit at a rate
of pay equal to the prevailing wage as enforced by the aforemen-
tioned provision of the New York State Constitution. 4 Although
article I, section 17, of the New York State Constitution refers pri-
marily to employees of contractors and subcontractors, in Young v.
Toia, the court interpreted article 1, section 17, to apply to Home
Relief recipients assigned to work in municipalities or nonprofit
agencies.45 Young expressly rejects the notion that Home Relief
recipients involved in workfare programs should be treated as civil
service employees and, therefore, found to be outside the scope of
article I, section 17, as in Corrigan v. Joseph.46
42 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17.
43 N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAw §§ 164(2)(a), (3)(b) (McKinney 1996) (repealed 1997) (empha-
sis added).
44 See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 38, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
4' 93 Misc.2d 1005, 403 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. Orleans County 1977). Young in-
volved home relief recipients required to participate in a work program an average of
three full days a week, regardless of the amount of assistance received. This resulted in
recipients being paid at rates far below the minimum wage, as low 45 cents an hour in
some cases. See id. at 1007-09, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93. However, the effect was simi-
lar to that in Brukhman because participants had little choice: either refuse to work
and loose all benefits or "comply with the new law and work in a kind of involuntary
servitude at an hourly rate which no one would seriously expect an employee to work
for.' Id. at 1009, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 393. Similarly, in both Young and Brukhman no one
would expect city workers to do the tasks performed by the Home Relief and WEP
workers at merely minimum wage.
304 N.Y. 172, 106 N.E.2d 593 (1952).
[Vol. 64: 2
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For AFDC recipients, under the old regime, participation in the
WEP program was guided by Social Services Law section 336-c.
This statute specifically mentioned prevailing wage in outlining the
number of hours a participant is required to work as follows:
A recipient may be assigned to participate in such [a] work experience
program only if."... (b) the number of hours that any such person may be
required to work in any month does not exceed a number which equals
the amount of assistance payable with respect to the family of which such
person is a member,... divided by the higher of (1) the federal minimum
wage, or (2) the state minimum wage, or (3) the rate of pay for persons
employed in the same or similar occupations by the same employer at the
same or equivalent site"'
A reading of the statute shows that for AFDC recipients, the require-
ment to pay prevailing wages was even more explicit than for
Home Relief. Specifically, Social Services Law section 336-c man-
dates that New York City pay WEP workers "the rate of pay for
persons employed in the same or similar occupations by the same
employer at the same or equivalent site."48
The failure of New York City to meet its constitutional require-
ment that it pay workfare participants prevailing wages was the
main focus of the class action lawsuit in Brukhman v. Giuliani.49
Plaintiffs in Brukhman, public assistance workers, through the help
of several nonprofit legal assistance organizations (the Legal Aid
Society, Center on Social Welfare Policy, and the New York
Employment Law Project), challenged this inconsistency of the New
York City WEP program.
B. WEP Participants' Work is Comparable to that of City Workers
In Brukhman, the plaintiffs challenged New York City's practice
of crediting WEP workers utilizing the federal minimum wage rather
than the prevailing or comparable wage."0 In many instances, WEP
workers work side by side with city employees, performing the
47 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw §336-c(2)(b) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
48 Id.
49 See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 35, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 919. Although the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, 1st Department reversed the lower court's holding, the 4th
Department held the opposite in a similar matter. Enzion v. Wing, 670 N.Y.S.2d 283
(4th Dep't 1998). Ultimately, this issue should be resolved by the New York State
Court of Appeals, especially since it involves interpretation of the New York State Con-
stitution.
10 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 1.
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basic tasks required in various city agencies. WEP workers work
with sanitation employees sweeping garbage, picking up debris, and
cleaning sanitation trucks."' Moreover, WEP workers serve as of-
fice workers, filing documents, handling telephone inquiries, and
assisting the public; as hospital employees, cleaning buildings,
emptying bedpans, and serving meals; and as park employees, con-
structing fences and barricades, making repairs, and painting and
maintaining park grounds.5 2 In each of these cases, city employees
were paid a higher salary (the lowest paid clerical workers earned
$8.69 per hour and the minimum blue collar worker earned $9.10
per hour), 3 while the WEP workers were credited towards their
public assistance benefits at either the federal minimum wage, at
that time $4.75 per hour,5 4 or in some cases at less than the mini-
mum wage.5 Further, some WEP workers performed more ad-
vanced work, which normally would have been compensated at
even higher wages by the City. For instance, one WEP worker re-
paired electrical equipment and machinery, normally compensated
at $15.75 per hour. Another worker performed high-level clerical
work, with a minimum salary of $21,105 per year. Another per-
formed more complex duties, even training a new office worker,
and another served as an interpreter, a position normally compen-
sated by the City at an annual salary of $29,920.6 All of these
WEP workers were paid (or credited at) no more than $4.75 per
hour.
In Brukhman, the City claimed that WEP workers were not
eligible for a comparable wage since WEP workers performed differ-
ent activities from regular city employees.5 The City argued that
fine distinctions existed between the WEP workers' job descriptions
and those of the regular city employees.5 8 For instance, for clerical
workers, the City claimed that WEP workers handled only routine
telephone inquiries, while city workers handled complex phone
calls and that WEP workers performed simple filing, while city
s See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 34, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
52 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 2-3.
See id. at 5
s The federal minimum wage was raised to $5.15 per hour beginning in September
of 1997, after this case was decided. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1996).
s See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 4.
See id. at 5-6.
51 See City Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 12.
' See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc.2d 26, 34, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd 678 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1998).
[Vol. 64: 2
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workers handled complex filing. 9 The City further argued that
WEP sanitation workers and city employees performed different jobs
because WEP workers swept city streets, removed the debris and
placed it in a garbage can, while city workers also transferred the
garbage to a truck; WEP park workers raked leaves, picked up trash,
assisted gardeners, swept and mopped floors, while some city park
workers also removed hazardous materials, and city gardeners
trained the WEP workers who assisted them.6" Moreover, the City
argued that a WEP worker assigned to the Income Support Office as
a translator for non-English speaking clients and clerical worker is
not comparable to a civil service employee because she is not per-
mitted to access the computer system and she performs translations
only in emergency situations.6
That a WEP worker, who works only 20 hours per week,62
does not perform the full range of tasks of a full-time employee is
understandable given the difference in time spent on the job. The
difference in skill level is also logical; a newly placed WEP worker
will most likely be less experienced than an existing city employee.
It is also normal practice that the experienced city gardener would
train the WEP worker. However, this hardly differs from any entry
level city employee who requires on-the-job training from more
experienced workers, even though the two are paid at the same
level or hold the same job title.63 Yet, in such a case, the entry-
level employee does not begin at minimum wage due to his or her
inexperience. Taking the City's logic a step further, the WEP em-
ployee who trains a new office worker should be paid more than
the new regular city employee. The Brukhman court did not accept
the City's hairsplitting distinctions or the City's attempts to minimize
the tasks of the WEP workers. Instead, it held that WEP workers' re-
sponsibilities were virtually the same, if not exactly the same, as
those of city employees.'
There are several indications that these artificial distinctions
between the city workers' jobs and the WEP workers' job descrip-
tions were nothing more than an attempt to avoid compliance with
59 See City Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 12.
' See id. at 18.
61 See id. at 17.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. 11 1996).




the prevailing wage standard." First, the City claimed there were
no WEP workers comparable to city employees and that all the job
titles held by WEP workers "do not otherwise exist in the City work
force."66 However, WEP workers type, file and photocopy as do
office workers; mop, dust, maintain grounds or clean streets as do
housekeeping or maintenance workers; and assist the elderly or pre-
pare food as do health aides. Given the range of activities per-
formed by the approximately 38,000 WEP workers67 and the simi-
larities of these tasks to those of regular city employees, it is not
illogical to assert that none of these individuals are comparable
workers.68
Second, the City claimed that every WEP worker, regardless of
his or her work responsibilities, was credited for their work at the
same wage level-the federal minimum wage.69 The City saw no
distinctions warranting different wages among the WEP workers.
Yet, the job descriptions of the sample WEP workers varied consid-
erably." Further, the rates of pay of the workers equivalent to the
few sample WEP workers in Brukhman ranged from $16,573 to
$29,920 annually.
71
Finally, the City took great pains to ensure that no WEP worker
would ever be comparable to a city worker. Deputy Commissioner
Diamond of the New York City Human Resources Administration
("HRA") instructed his staff that "an individual WEP worker should
not be assigned to perform the same range of activities as city em-
ployees working at the same or an equivalent site."72 This memo-
randum clearly exhibits the City's intention to erect and maintain an
artificial barrier between the job titles and work activities of WEP
workers and regular employees. The effect of this practice was to
avoid the prevailing wage requirements of calculating the correct
pay or credit of WEP workers.73
6s See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 37, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
66 Id. at 33, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (quoting Aff. of Seth Diamond, Deputy Comm'r,
Human Resources Administration (HRA) at 19, 24).
67 See THE CITY OF NEw YORK, MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997 SUMMARY
VOL. 67.
See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 37, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
69 Id. at 33, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
70 See supra Part ll.B.
71 See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 5.
Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 33, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (citing Diamond Memoran-
dum dated April 23, 1997).
See id. at 37, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
[Vol. 64:2
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The City's premise that the WEP workers' job responsibilities
were fundamentally different from those of their city employee co-
workers in every case contradicts the professed intent of both the
PRWORA74 and New York City's Work Experience Program. WEP
was designed to move Home Relief recipients, and later AFDC
recipients, from public assistance to full-time employment.' In
fact, the HRA Deputy Commissioner noted that WEP's goal is "to
enable an increasingly large population of participants to achieve
economic independence through permanent full-time employ-
ment."76 Further, the WEP Policy and Procedures Manual grants
participants the right to "be assigned sufficient work to [make] them
productive throughout their assignment" and "they are expected to
become a team player; learn as much as possible; ... ask for more
work if they are feeling unchallenged."77
How are these lofty goals of providing WEP workers challeng-
ing work, and eventually finding them full-time employment, to be
achieved if WEP workers' job responsibilities are mandated by the
HRA Deputy Commissioner always to be distinct from those of city
workers? If WEP workers were to ask for additional responsibilities
to ensure that they are adequately challenged, this would likely
mean taking on tasks similar to those of city workers and, therefore,
violating the Deputy Commissioner's aforementioned policy.78 If
WEP workers are really to become team players, then the artificial
barriers preventing them from performing all tasks, especially work
comparable to that of other city employees, must be eliminated. The
City's position is clearly contrary to the stated goals of their social
programs and to the internal procedures and policies that provide
avenues for increased experience and responsibility for WEP
participants.79
Moreover, the City's position belies fairness and common
sense. If workfare participants are truly prevented from performing
the same range of activities as regular city employees or their work
I In signing the PRWORA, Clinton noted that he wanted to change the system that
'exil[ed recipients] from the entire community of work' and vowed to initiate companion
job creation programs for the poor. Clines, supra note 7, at Al.
"s See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 30, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
76 Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 33, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (citing Aff. of Seth Diamond,
Deputy Comm'r, HRA at 15).
77 Id. (quoting WEP Policy and Procedures Manual).
73 See text accompanying supra note 72.
" See Brukhman, 174 Misc.2d at 34, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
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is characterized as less valuable than regular employees in order to
avoid paying participants prevailing wages, then the goals of the
PRWORA and WEP, to move public assistance recipients into full-
time employment, can never be achieved.
Fortunately, the Brukhman court concluded that the WEP work-
ers were doing exactly or virtually the same jobs as city
employees.80 Therefore, New York State laws in existence until
1997 mandated that they be paid prevailing wages or wages
comparable to their regular city employee counterparts."'
Ill. THE REACTION TO BRUKHMAN
As part of the process of implementing the PRWORA and be-
coming eligible to receive the PRWORA block grant, New York was
required to submit a plan to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services by July 1, 1997.82 However, New York's
plan, the Welfare Reform Act of 1997,3 was not signed by the
Governor until August 20, 1997 after being passed by the New
York State legislature as part of the flurry of end of session bills. As
part of that measure, the legislature attempted to limit the effect of
the Brukhman decision through changes in the social services law.
The thrust of the changes was to prevent WEP workers from being
protected by article I, section 17, of the New York State Constitu-
tion, which requires that workers performing "public works" be paid
prevailing wages. 4
To achieve its goal, the legislature modified the language of
Social Services Law section 336-c (2)(b), altering the requirement
that the number of hours that a person works may not exceed the
assistance received "divided by the higher of (1) the federal mini-
mum wage, or (2) the state minimum wage, or (3) the rate of pay for
persons employed in the same or similar occupations by the same
employer at the same or equivalent site."" Specifically, the legisla-
ture eliminated the comparable wage option in (3) above. 6 This
I See id. at 37, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
81 See supra Part II.A.
82 Greenberg & Savner, Temporary Assistance, supra note 20.
11 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap. 436.
8 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 17; see also supra Part II.A.
8s N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(b) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
'6 Compare N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(b) (McKinney 1996), with 1997 N.Y.
Laws Chap 436, Sec. 148.
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provision applied to AFDC recipients, now more or !ess subsumed
in the new category of Family Assistance (New York's version of
TANF).87
Moreover, the New York State legislature wholly eliminated
section 164 of the New York Social Services Law, which referred to
the work assignments of benefit recipients as "public works."88
This section applied to Home Relief recipients, who are now mainly
subsumed in the new category Safety Net Assistance.89 Everyone
participating in the WEP program, including former Home Relief
recipients, is now covered by section 336.'
Finally, the new legislation abolished the Job Opportunity Pro-
gram recognized under Social Services Law section 336-e. This
section permitted the establishment of a job opportunity program for
public assistance recipients.91 It mandated that:
[a] person participating in a program operated pursuant to this section
shall be hired by a participating employer for a job of at least twenty
hours per week. The salary shall be the wage paid for comparable work
done by the employer's regular employees but in no event shall be less
that the state minimum wage.92
Thus, the New York State legislature, by eliminating the above
references to comparable wages and public works, attempted to
limit the decision in Brukhman mandating prevailing wages for WEP
workers.
IV. WEP WORKERS STILL DESERVE COMPARABLE WAGES
The Appellate Division, First Department, held that the state
legislature was successful. The court held that once the explicit
statutory language mandating prevailing wages be paid to WEP
workers was removed, the constitution alone was insufficient pro-
tection since it only applied to contractors and subcontractors.93
The Fourth Department, however, came to a different conclusion in
" See Don Friedman, The Welfare Reform Act of 1997 (Community Food Resource
Center, Inc. Aug. 20, 1997).
0 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap 436, § 148.
89 See Friedman, supra note 87, at 2.
90 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 336 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1998)
91 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw § 336-e (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
92 N.Y. SoC. SERv. LAw § 336-e(2) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997) (emphasis
added).
11 See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 678 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (1st Dep't 1998).
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Enzian v. Wing on March 13, 1998, almost seven months after the
state legislature eliminated the prevailing wage language from the
social services statute. 4 Although not explicitly addressing New
York's constitutional provision, the appellate court held that a WEP
worker who was designing data base systems and performing com-
puter programming because of his advanced skills was entitled to
prevailing wages.9"
One can also argue for payment of prevailing wages, even
without the explicit language of the social services statute, by com-
paring the language of New York's constitution and current statute
with the work performed by welfare recipients. At least some jobs
performed by WEP workers are indeed public works, whether or
not the statute explicitly uses that language. 6
Prior to discussing the current development of the law, a look
at former versions is mandated. The language of the former section
164, which determined the workfare assignments for Home Relief
recipients, indicated which activities are to be considered public
works. Specifically, public works included employment with vari-
ous divisions of local governments and with nonprofit agencies per-
forming work for the municipality under contract."' These are ex-
actly the type of positions to which WEP participants are commonly
assigned, namely assisting in city agencies and nonprofits under
contract with the city. 8 The court in Young agreed that such activi-
ties are public works.9 Moreover, the Brukhman court noted that
workfare assignments historically have been public work.1"
For AFDC recipients, the former statute provided that "a recipi-
ent may be assigned to participate in such work experience program
only if: ... (i) the project to which the participant is assigned serves
9 670 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th Dep't 1998).
" See id.
9 The New York State Constitution mandates that prevailing wages be paid for pub-
lic works: "No laborer, workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or subcon-
tractor engaged in the performance of any public work, . . . shall ... be paid less
than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade or occupation in the locality within
the state where such public work is to be situated, erected or used." N.Y. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 17 (emphasis added).
97 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 164(2)(a) (McKinney 1996) (repealed 1997).
9 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 2-5.
9 See supra note 45. The decision in Young v. Toia provided a more detailed anal-
ysis of "public works" than the offhand remark found in Brukhman. 678 N.Y.S.2d 45,
47 (1st Dep't 1998).
1"0 See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc.2d 26, 36, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 919 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd 678 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1998).
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a useful public purpose." ' Clearly, this language references pub-
lic work. Moreover, the activities of WEP participants, i.e., cleaning
parks and city streets, helping in public hospitals, and providing
social services are consummate examples of public work, activities
that provide a "useful public purpose." In fact, the social services
law offers those same examples when defining projects that serve a
useful public purpose.
102
Under the new statute, the language requiring that work pro-
jects for public assistance recipients be for a "useful public purpose'
has been retained and now applies to all public assistance recipi-
ents who participate in such activities." 3 This language maintains
the historical notion that workfare assignments to city agencies and
non profits for which recipients perform activities that serve a "use-
ful public purpose" constitute public work. Despite the legislative
changes discussed supra Part Ill, since New York's constitution
cannot be changed with simple legislation,1" article I, section 17,
still applies to the vast majority of WEP workers who are performing
jobs that serve a "useful public purpose." Thus, by virtue of the
New York State Constitution, article I, section 17, public assistance
workers performing public works are required to be paid prevailing
wage.' Given the disagreement on this issue in the Appellate
Division, ultimately the New York State Court of Appeals will have
to decide whether the constitutional provision mandating prevailing
wages for public works applies to WEP workers.
A. Anti-Displacement Protection
The anti-displacement statute merely prevents New York City
from replacing regular city jobs with WEP workers, rather than
mandating any particular pay rate for WEP employees."
1o, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(i) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997) (emphasis
added).
102 See id.
103 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 336-c(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
104 Changes to the state constitution require either two votes of the legislature and a
vote by the electorate at large or a constitutional convention. N.Y. CONsT. art. XIX, §§
1, 2. The electorate votes every 20 years whether or not to hold a constitutional con-
vention and such a convention was recently rejected on Election Day, November 4,
1997. See Richard Perez-Pefia, Voters Reject Constitutional Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1997, at B1.
-o See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17.
' See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 336-c(2)(e) (McKinney 1998).
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However, if the City were required to pay WEP workers prevailing
wages rather than minimum wage, the financial incentive to substi-
tute WEP workers for existing city workers or work activities would
be at least partially eliminated. Without a financial incentive, the
most detrimental aspects anticipated by the anti-displacement statute
would be eliminated. In fact, if there were no financial benefit for
preferring WEP workers over regular workers, the City would prefer
to retain its long-term, experienced workers. Alternatively, if the
City chose to assign and train WEP workers, it would have a greater
incentive to maintain them in positions long enough to take advan-
tage of the experience they acquire, thereby providing them long-
term employment.
The City's WEP program violates the anti-displacement provi-
sion of both the PRWORA and the New York statute." 7 The origi-
nal anti-displacement provision prevented the use of workfare em-
ployees to displace current employees or positions; to fill positions
of employees on layoff, termination or other workforce reductions;
or to eliminate promotional opportunities.0 8 In fact, New York
strengthened its anti-displacement provision with the enactment of
the Welfare Reform Act of 1997."9 The legislation enhanced the
anti-displacement protection by prohibiting use of workfare partici-
pants to perform "a substantial portion of the work ordinarily
performed by regular employees."" 0
In Brukhman, the WEP workers were found to be doing exactly
what the statute prohibits, performing virtually the identical work
performed by regular employees."' Even if one accepted the
City's argument that the WEP workers did not perform all the tasks
of the regular city employees, the court held that the tasks per-
formed were at least similar, and, therefore, the job functions were
equivalent to that of regular city workers." 2 Therefore, the City is
violating the anti-displacement provision by permitting WEP work-
ers to perform "a substantial portion of the work ordinarily per-
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 607(0(2) (Supp. II 1996); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 336-c(2)(0
(McKinney Supp. 1998).
1-9 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(0 (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
109 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap 436, § 148. Since the law has yet to be fully interpreted,
this assessment is based on an analysis of the Welfare Reform Act of 1997. See Fried-
man, supra note 87.
10 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap 436, § 148.
"I See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc.2d 26, 34, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918 (N.Y.




formed by regular employees."113 Given that the WEP worker is
paid merely at minimum wage, the City has a strong incentive to
prefer WEP workers to regular employees. Paying WEP workers
comparable wages, however, would eliminate the need for
protections of the anti-displacement statute.
Even without the strengthened anti-displacement statute, both
the PRWORA and state anti-displacement statute bar displacing
current employees or positions."14 Although difficult to prove as
the City takes great pains to deny it,"' evidence exists that jobs
are being lost through attrition and positions replaced by WEP
workers. Approximately 22,000 public-sector jobs were lost from
December, 1993 to June, 1997,11 between 11,000 and 17,000
from the membership of the City's major union, District Council 37
("DC 37"), in 1994 alone." 7 Even the Parks Commissioner has
noted that substantial numbers of jobs have been lost through attri-
tion." 8 Probably not by mere coincidence, the City now has
approximately 38,000"' WEP workers.
There are many indications that these WEP workers are now
presently responsible for maintaining city functions. Commissioner
Stern admitted that the WEP workers, whose numbers have in-
creased from 600 to 5,400 in his agency alone, perform a valuable
service, and enable the Parks Department to meet the standards to
keep the New York City parks clean. 20 Others have noted that in
the Parks Department, which has been the most severely decimated
by personnel cutbacks, "the only paid employees left are supervi-
sors-the rest are WEP workers."' 2' Further, "[P]arks isn't the only
113 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 336-c(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 607(0(2) (Supp. 11 1996); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 336-c(2)(e); see
also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §336-c(2)(0 (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997).
"' See Louis Uchitelle, Welfare Recipients Taking Jobs Often Held by the Working
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
116 See THE CITY OF NEw YORK, MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997 SUMMARY
VOL at 22.
117 See Bob Fitch, Sleeping with the Enemy: Why New York's Unions Backed the
Most Anitlabor Mayor in History, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 4, 1997, at 53.
"a8 See New York City Parks Comm'r Henry Stem, Address at New York Law School
City Law Breakfast (Sept. 27, 1996) (on videotape).
119 See THE CITY OF NEW YORK MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997 SUMMARY
VOL at 67.
12 See New York City Parks Comm'r Henry Stem,'Address at New York Law School
City Law Breakfast (Sept. 27, 1996) (on videotape).
12 Telephone interview with Bill Henning, Vice-President, Communications Workers of
America, Local 1180 (Oct. 1997) (representing city employeqs).
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department that has lost positions through attrition only to see those
functions replaced by WEP workers; it is only the most egregious.
This is happening in agencies throughout the city.
"1 22
Union leaders and WEP supervisors, who face this situation
daily, have also noticed this trend. District Council 37 Local Presi-
dent James Butler testified that 472 WEP workers had filled the
positions of 896 city hospital employees who had accepted sever-
ance packages from the Giuliani administration.123 WEP supervi-
sors admitted in interviews with the Community Food Resource
Center that the WEP workers were desperately needed in their
agencies to fill the positions of lost civil service employees.24 Fur-
ther, in 1996, the Transport Workers Union agreed to allow WEP
workers to fill slots lost by attrition in return for a promise of no
layoffs.
125
The same trend of attrition and replacement by workfare partic-
ipants has been observed elsewhere. In Buffalo, a local union leader
noted that "[e]very time one of our laborers leaves, especially on
the cleaning staff, they are replaced by workfare people."' 26  A
Jersey City welfare program administrator noted, "'What infuriates
me... is that you read in the newspapers that hospitals like the
Jersey City Medical Center are laying off workers, or cutting their
hours. And at the same time, we get requests from the Medical




The Mayor's management reports exhibit further evidence of a
trend in the reduction of city jobs through attrition in agencies that
receive the most WEP workers: Department of Parks and Recre-
122 Id.
123 See Liz Krueger et al., Workfare: The Real Deal 1/ 10 (Community Food Resource
Center, Inc. July 1997) (citing testimony of James Butler, President, DC 37, Local 420)
(representing municipal hospital workers before the New York City Council in March
1996).
124 See Krueger et al, supra note 123, at 10. Some supervisors stated that their entire
staff consisted of WEP workers. Id.
" See Richard Perez-Pefia, Transit Pact is Approved by Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1996, at B1. The Mayor publicly refused to approve this deal since it would blatant-
ly violate his agreement with DC 37 which said no union jobs would be replaced by
welfare recipients. However, the Community Food Resource Center, through interviews
with WEP participants, supervisors, City agency personnel, and labor unions found that
the Mayor is replacing workers with WEP participants-albeit not publicly. See Krueger
et al., supra note 123, at 10.
1 Susan Schulman, Workfare Recipients Hope for Steady Jobs, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct.
1, 1996, at Al (quoting John M. Orlando, President, Local 1095).
' Uchitelle, supra note 115.
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ation, 30% reduction from fiscal year 1994 to 1997; Health and
Hospitals Corporation, 27% reduction from fiscal year 1993 to
1997; Department of Transportation, loss of 6,418 from fiscal year
1996 to 1997, loss of 4,001 from fiscal year 1997, and loss of
3,921 from proposed fiscal year 1998.128 Further, the report notes
that custodial staff employed by the Department of Citywide Admin-
istrative Services (formerly Department of General Services) has
more WEP workers than full-time employees-322 full-time
employees and the equivalent of 429 full-time WEP worker
positions.'29
The City argues that it just cannot afford the jobs lost through
attrition and would not replace them if WEP workers were not
available. However, it seems an unlikely coincidence that at least
one agency has been virtually decimated of regular employees and
its functions filled with WEP workers just as WEP workers became
available in such massive numbers. Moreover, regular positions are
being lost to attrition and buyouts while the WEP program has been
expanding. In addition, it is unreasonable that a city agency could
continue to function with a substantial cut in its workforce as has
the Parks Department or the custodial staff of the Department of
Citywide Administrative Services.
Moreover, the City's arguments fall under the sheer weight of
the numbers. The 100,000 WEP participants expected to be en-
rolled in the program by 2001 will amount to one-third of the city's
entire workforce.' A study of the impact of adding WEP workers
to the workforce, based on an elasticity of demand analysis, shows
that the effect is displacement of workers, depression of wages for
the workers that remain, or a combination of both.'3 ' In fact,
economists say that given the thriving economy and low unemploy-
128 See THE CrTY OF NEw YORK, MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997, SUMMARY
VOL at 27; THE CITY OF NEw YORK, MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997, VOL II,
AGENCY AND CrrYwIDE INDICATORS at 203-209.
119 See THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1997, VOL II,
AGENCY AND CITYWIDE INDICATORS at 181. This means there are far more WEP workers
than indicated since each WEP worker performs about 20 hours of work per week.
130 See David Firestone, New York Girding for Surge in Workfare jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1996, at Al.
13 TILLY, supra note 12, at 2. Ms. Tilly, Associate Professor of Policy and Planning at
the University of Massachusetts, has found that every 1,000 workfare participants work-
ing 26 hours per week results in 660 workers being displaced or results in wages being




ment, employers generally have to scramble to find entry-level
workers by raising wages.132 However, the pressure to increase
wages for such jobs has been dulled because of the injection of
workfare participants. 3 A Salt Lake City temporary employment
service enjoyed this consequence and would have been unable to
fill its orders for temporary employees without paying higher hourly
wages but for the influx of welfare workers. 34
B. Public Policy
Even if, in light of the City's vehement denial, one cannot
definitively prove that the City is actually replacing jobs it would be
forced to fill but for the availability of WEP participants, one can
clearly show that the City's denial is highly suspect. Further, the
great financial incentive alone to use a WEP worker, who is paid no
more than the benefit she or he would have received anyway,
makes it more probable than not that regular positions are being
replaced or wages depressed as a result of WEP workers, and the
threat is greater as the WEP program expands. Such a threat, howev-
er, could be eliminated if the City were required to pay WEP work-
ers at prevailing rates-city workers would face less potential loss of
regular wage positions from layoffs and attrition, and their wage
depression would be reduced.
Paying prevailing wages would also be a public benefit to the
WEP workers, themselves. First, many would be credited at higher
wages, thereby reducing the number of hours they had to spend at
their workfare assignment. This would enable them to spend more
time searching for permanent jobs, tending to child care, or partici-
pating in education or job training to improve their skills and mar-
ketability. Furthermore, if WEP workers were paid prevailing wages,
the City would cease trying to artificially distinguish their jobs from
those of regular workers, making them more employable when they
try to obtain permanent jobs. Moreover, if the financial incentive to
use WEP workers as opposed to regular workers was reduced, there
would be more job opportunities overall, and, therefore, WEP work-
ers would have increased opportunities for meaningful employment.





Before adding almost 30,000 WEP workers to the program next
year and 100,000 WEP workers by 2001,' all at minimum wage,
the detrimental effects of the program on the City's regular, union-
ized workforce, on future city jobs, and on WEP workers must be
addressed.
V. FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE PRWORA
A. Detrimental Financial Incentives
The PRWORA and its implementation in New York are fraught
with financial implications that tend to harm the participants. For in-
stance, as the program is fully implemented, states will receive less
funding for welfare.'36
Given this reduction in actual funding, states are worried about
additional costs mandated by the PRWORA. In fact, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated that states would have to spend
approximately $13 billion between 1997 and 2002 to administer
workfare programs.17 In New York, when the PRWORA passed,
there were dire predictions about the cost its implementation would
have on the state. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan estimated that
implementing the workfare portion of the welfare bill would cost
Erie County $55 million.'38 State government officials estimated
that implementing workfare would cost the state $1.3 billion over
the next five years for public works projects, subsidies to private
companies to hire recipients, day care and job training.'39 The po-
tential cost burden feared by the state and local governments is
worrisome in that it provides an incentive to cut some of the most
expensive aspects of workfare, namely education and job train-
ing. 4 For a sizable portion of the workfare participants, these as-
pects of the program are more effective in helping them obtain and
keep permanent jobs and, consequently, remain off public
assistance. 4 '
133 See Fitch, supra note 117, at 53.
' See Super et al., supra note 22, at Part II.
237 What Workfare Means, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 1, 1996, at 6A.
13 See Schulman, supra note 126, at Al.
139 See Jon R. Sorensen, Only Thing That's Certain is Reform Will Cost State,
BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 3, 1996, at 1A.
11 See Sennott, supra note 4, at 1.
141 See Schulman, supra note 126, at Al.
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B. Elimination of Preferred Hiring Status
The Welfare Reform Act of 1997,142 in addition to the afore-
mentioned elimination of references to public works in the social
services law, removed provisions that would have enhanced
workfare participants' chances of finding permanent jobs. The legis-
lature eliminated a provision that required the City to interview and
consider WEP participants for openings in job titles similar to their
placements. 143 Removal of this provision severely injures WEP
workers' opportunities to obtain jobs in the sites they are already
placed.
The legislature further eliminated a requirement that "the prior
training, experience and skills of a person ... are taken into ac-
count in making [workfare] assignments."144 This provision, had it
been adhered to, could have helped enhance a workfare
participant's existing skills. Instead, without this provision, welfare
recipients are being required to work in positions in which they
have little training or inclination, making placements more likely to
be in dead end positions.
The Welfare Reform Act also eliminated a section noting that
the workfare assignment was intended to improve employability of
the participant.14 Removing this section is a further indication of
the legislature's tendency to put a higher priority on easy implemen-
tation of a social program than on long-term benefits afforded to
welfare recipients.
C. Workfare does not Lead to Jobs
Despite the hope that national welfare reform, especially
workfare, would be a panacea for many ills,14 it has not even
been particularly effective at taking participants off the welfare rolls
and placing them into permanent jobs. Just over a year after enact-
ment of the PRWORA, evidence suggests that only about one-half of
142 1997 N.Y. Laws Chap 436, § 148.
143 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW, § 336-c(4) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997); 1997
N.Y. Laws, Chap. 436, § 148.
144 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(g) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997); 1997 N.Y.
Laws, Chap. 436, § 148.
145 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(j) (McKinney 1996) (amended 1997); 1997
N.Y. Laws Chap 436, § 148.
"'See 42 U.S.C. 601(a) (1998).
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those leaving the welfare rolls have jobs, a percentage no better
than in periods of weaker economies and less stringent welfare
rules. 47 Moreover, a New York State survey found that after three
months off of the welfare rolls, fewer than one-third had found full
or part-time employment.'48 In New York City, data from the Hu-
man Resources Administration show that since the expansion of
WEP, movement from welfare to work is much lower than in
previous years.'49
Unions, social service workers, people who run training pro-
grams and participants, themselves, do not believe that workfare
adequately prepares welfare recipients for entering the job market
and retaining employment. Many believe that people assigned to
workfare are not only untrained but are virtually "no hires."'
This belief is exacerbated by the fact that the major placement for
WEP workers-city agencies-are not hiring, and nonprofits, which
face funding cuts, cannot absorb the labor."' To make matters
worse, workfare participants are not evaluated based on employabil-
ity, work experience or advanced degrees, often making their place-
ments inappropriate.5 2 Participants, themselves, feel the workfare
experience does not provide training.5 3 Instead, many believe
147 See DeParle, supra note 1, at Al.
, Alan Finder, Evidence is Scant that Welfare Leads to Full-Time jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
April 12, 1998, at Al.
149 See Krueger et al., supra note 123, at 7. From October 1993 through September
1994, 862 people per month moved from welfare to work as compared to 420 in 1995-
1996. Id.
1 0 Joel M. Poch, Workfare-An Analysis of a Doomed Elixir, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42, 43
(1997).
IS! See Krueger et al., supra note 123, at 6.
152 See Krueger et al., supra note 123, at 6.
3 See, e.g., Firestone, supra note 130, at Al; Schulman, supra note 126, at Al.
Further, the need for real training and assistance with full-time job placement, rather
than restricted work activities, is illustrated by the case of E. Margarita Maldonado. She
was a welfare recipient who was enrolled in a training program run by Cooperative
Home Care Associates, an organization which trains welfare recipients and then hires
them to work as home heath care aides in their organization.
While participating in the program, Ms. Maldonado was called by the City for a
WEP assignment cleaning parks and was forced to choose between taking the WEP
assignment or remaining with the training program and risk losing her welfare benefits.
While comparing the benefits of the training program over the WEP assignment, she not-
ed, "Picking up, I do that in my house. I don't call that experience." Elizabeth Kolbert,
Workfare Makes a Break Hard to Give, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at BI.
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that classroom training, employment training programs, and general
education are more effective in moving welfare recipients into
permanent employment."54
CONCLUSION
The impetus for welfare reform, and subsequent passage of the
PRWORA, arose from grossly inflated figures about the cost of
welfare' and resentment for those receiving free benefits." 6
The government, at the federal, state and local levels, has been able
to use these fictions to create a program that generates virtually free
workers and, therefore, depresses wages for all affected.
New York's workfare program, WEP, has provided approxi-
mately 35,000 additional city workers, a figure which has steadfast-
ly risen in the past few years and is intended to increase to 100,000
by 2001."5 This labor is virtually cost free compared with regular
city workers. The City is already paying the WEP workers their
benefits, whether or not they work, in the form of welfare grants
and food stamps, and the City saves additional salary costs by cred-
iting this salary at minimum wage, rather than the living
wage negotiated over the years by the municipal unions.
The City comes out the winner-it obtains additional labor to
improve and maintain city services at minimal budgetary cost. How-
ever, the victory is a hollow one because it comes at too great an
expense. Welfare workers, no matter what their experience or ex-
pertise, work for minimum wage. They work in jobs that the City
characterizes as having far less experiential value than is the reality
in order to ensure that the City can pay only minimum wage and
avoid violating the anti-displacement statute. This has the effect of
hindering welfare recipients' chances of entering the permanent job
market. Additionally, the program either takes away permanent job
slots or depresses wages by paying WEP workers to do the same
work as regular city workers but for a substantially lower wage.
Before we expand this program, we should examine whether
the cost is really worth the short-term financial benefit. We must
decide whether we want to risk creating a city where the living
14 See Krueger et al., supra note 123, at 8; Schulman, supra note 126, at Al.
155 See supra Introduction.
1 See Clines, supra note 7, at Al.
t See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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standard is depressed for much of the workforce to a standard be-
low that of a living wage. "A 'workfare' workforce without training,
without hope, and without both actual job placement and job
creation programs is a recipe for disaster .... 1158
Lauri Cohen
"a See Poch, supra note 150, at 42.
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